It seems that many arguments against libertarianism is that it's very absolutist in its conclusions. That is, we're against all forms of taxation, regardless of the programs for which the taxes are used, such as welfare. There are some who are moderate libertarians (what I like to call quasi-libertarians, or minarchists), and there are some who are libertarians in name only (what I like to call pseudo-libertarians, such as Glenn Beck), but these libertarians usually deflect these arguments by saying that they are for taxation under certain circumstances. However, those deontological libertarians who are consistent and oppose taxation for what it really is - theft - can't so easily argue against the accusation. At least, one would think so. It seems that the average person loves consistency until it conflicts with their pre-determined beliefs. For some reason, the same person who would point out one's inconsistency as bad thing would also point out one's consistency as a bad thing if they don't like the conclusions.
So, one must decide whether consistency or inconsistency as a bad thing. One may quote Ralph Waldo Emerson: "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesman and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do." Of course, there are two points I must address in this quote: first, it applies to foolish consistency; second, how is one to determine what is foolish? I mean, I could argue that consistent pragmatism in and of itself is foolish, since it never takes ethics into question (pragmatism is to be differentiated from consequentialism, which is rightfully considered a normative ethical philosophy). One could also argue that deontology is foolish, since it never takes consequences into question. This list could go on forever. Folly may be objective - that is, it exists independent from observers - but we have yet to come to an agreement for what folly actually is for every single case. I would argue, however, that consistency is neither good nor bad, but rather a tool. If the premise is faulty, then the tool of consistency will be used improperly; if the premise is accurate, then the tool of consistency will be used properly.
So, naturally, the question arises: "Is deontological libertarianism based upon faulty premises, or upon accurate premises?" In order for me to answer that, I would have to ask myself: "Is it true that no individual nor group thereof may use initiatory force or its threat against an individual or his property? In other words, do one person's rights only extend as far as another person's rights?" I think that many would answer yes to this question. If this is the case, why do people support taxation? I never agreed to the taxation; rather, the politicians did. One may ask, "What about the social contract?" I never agreed to the social contract; 222 years ago, 56 people signed the Constitution. I was not one of those 56 people. Nor did I send any of those 56 to represent me. So, I never agreed to it, and I never sent a representative to agree to it for me, I shouldn't be bound to it. Why? Because, according to the NAP, initiatory force or its threat shouldn't be used against me; in other words, an individual can't commit an act against me without my consent.
And this is why I'm a libertarian. It's a consistent philosophy. If you don't agree with it, fine, but if you disagree with the conclusions, argue why the premise(s) involved is/are wrong.
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